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From Santa Barbara to Macondo to SEMS 
David M. Hunter 
Kara McQueen-Borden* 
INTRODUCTION 
Failures of safety and environmental systems contributed to the 
blowout and explosion of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico on 
April 20, 2010, causing the largest oil spill in United States history.1 
Accordingly, safety and environmental management systems (SEMS) 
have been a focus of the broad regulatory responses to the Macondo 
event.2 The Department of the Interior (DOI) defines a SEMS program 
as “a comprehensive system to reduce human error and organizational 
failure” and explains that the intent of its SEMS program is “to focus 
attention on the role of human error and poor organization in accidents, 
drive continuous improvement in the offshore industry’s safety and 
environmental records, encourage the use of performance-based 
operating practices, and encourage [industry collaboration] to promote 
the interests of offshore worker safety and environmental protection.”3 
In Part I, this article traces the development of the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) regulatory regime through oil spills and other events that 
have inspired regulatory responses. In Part II, this article focuses on the 
SEMS regulations promulgated since the Macondo event. The article 
compares the predominantly regulatory response to the Macondo event 
with the predominantly legislative responses to earlier oil spills, all to 
identify the role of the SEMS regulations in the OCS regulatory scheme 
that is developing post Macondo. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by DAVID M. HUNTER & KARA MCQUEEN-BORDEN. 
  David M. Hunter is a partner and Kara McQueen-Borden is an associate of 
Jones Walker LLP. Both practice energy, environmental, and natural resources law in 
the firm’s Business and Commercial Transactions Practice Group. 
 1. See, e.g., National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore 
Drilling, 223 (2011) [hereinafter Nat’l Comm’n Report]. The Macondo well was 
located in the federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico, on Mississippi Canyon Block 252. 
 2. See, e.g., Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423 
(Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
 3. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 20,424. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OCS REGULATORY SCHEME THROUGH 2010 
The current regulatory scheme governing oil and gas activities on 
the OCS took shape, in large part, through a series of crises and 
corresponding legislative responses. This section traces the 
development of OCS legislation and regulations, from the “Seaweed 
Rebellion” of the mid-1900s through the Santa Barbara and Prince 
William Sound oil spills in the late 1900s, to provide an overview of the 
OCS regulatory scheme as it existed on the eve of the Macondo event. 
A. The Dispute Over Coastal Lands and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 
From its origin, federal authority over OCS resources developed 
through a series of jurisdictional disputes and environmental crises. The 
first event to spur legislation establishing federal authority over oil and 
gas activities on the OCS was the post-World War II dispute between 
coastal states and the federal government for control of the OCS.4 
Offshore oil wells began to operate in shallow coastal waters by the 
1890s; by 1919, the oil and natural gas industry had developed 
sufficiently to warrant forming its own national trade association, the 
American Petroleum Institute (API).5 In the early period of offshore oil 
exploration and production, coastal states and local entities generally 
exercised authority over activities in their coastal waters, and this 
included granting leases for offshore oil wells.6 Then, in 1945, President 
Harry S. Truman asserted federal authority over resources in offshore 
areas by means of a proclamation to “extend U.S. jurisdiction over the 
submerged lands and subsoil of the Outer Continental Shelf,” citing as 
justification the national “interest in [the] conservation and prudent 
                                                                                                             
 4. See, e.g., Sierra B. Weaver, Local Management of Natural Resources: Should 
Local Governments Be Able to Keep Oil Out?, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 232–
34 (2002). 
 5. See id.; Gordon L. James, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Amendments of 1978: Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, 40 
LA. L. REV. 177, 178 (1979); R.B. Krueger, The Development and Administration of 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. 
INST. 643, 675 (1968); API History, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http://www 
.americanpetroleuminstitute.com/globalitems/globalheader pages/about-api/api- 
history [perma.cc/QTS9-66BB] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 6. See James, supra note 5, at 178; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19, 38 (1947) (noting that California authorized permit-granting for offshore oil and 
gas prospecting through state legislation enacted in 1921); Weaver, supra note 4, at 
232–33. 
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utilization” of mineral resources found there.7 This sparked the first 
phase of the “Seaweed Rebellion” conflict between coastal states and 
the federal government,8 which in turn led to Supreme Court decisions 
recognizing federal authority over offshore lands.9 These disputes 
ultimately led to the enactment of two major pieces of federal legislation 
in 1953 to resolve state and federal roles with respect to mineral 
resources under the continental shelf: the Federal Submerged Lands Act 
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).10 
The OCSLA was, and remains, the primary federal statute 
governing resource development on submerged lands subject to federal 
control. It gives the Secretary of the DOI (the Secretary) authority to 
oversee federal OCS lands, including development of resources on the 
OCS by means of a competitive bidding process for granting oil and gas 
leases.11 The OCSLA declares, as the policy of the United States with 
respect to the development of these resources: 
[T]he outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve 
held by the Federal Government for the public, which should be 
made available for expeditious and orderly development, 
subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is 
consistent with the maintenance of competition and other 
national needs.12 
                                                                                                             
 7. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 
12, 305 (Sept. 28, 1945) (codified as Executive Order 9633). 
 8. E.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-
State/Provincial Conflicts Over Offshore Energy Development in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L., 255, 257–58 (1992). 
 9. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 
339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 38. 
 10. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953). The Federal Submerged Lands 
Act reverted authority to the states over the submerged coastal lands closest to the 
shorelines, setting the boundaries of state authority at three geographical miles from 
the state’s recognized coastline, with certain exceptions for historical boundaries in 
the Gulf of Mexico. See 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2012); see also id. §§ 1312–1313. In 
litigation following enactment of the Federal Submerged Lands Act, Texas and 
Florida established state authority over the area extending to the further boundary of 
three marine leagues (or about nine miles) from their respective coastlines. See United 
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 66 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 129 
(1960). 
 11. See 43 U.S.C. §1337(a). The OCSLA defines the “outer Continental Shelf” 
as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the [seaward boundaries of the 
States’ coastal waters], and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United 
States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1331(a). 
 12. 43 U.S.C. §1332(3). 
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The OCSLA also expressly acknowledges the interests of the states 
in this process, declaring that “the rights and responsibilities of all States 
. . . to preserve and protect their marine, human, and coastal 
environments . . . should be considered and recognized.”13 Federal OCS 
policy thus encompasses three main goals: development of resources for 
the (economic) benefit of the public, environmental protections, and 
maintenance of national interests (among them, the needs of the coastal 
states).14 Since each of these cannot be maximized simultaneously, there 
is a structural tension between and among the OCSLA’s goals that often 
plays out in the balancing of needs and priorities through the OCS 
leasing process. 
The OCSLA granted the Secretary authority to promulgate 
regulations for OCS leasing.15 Within a year of the OCSLA going into 
effect, the Secretary set forth the first OCSLA regulations.16 The 
Secretary also delegated authority to oversee the OCS leasing program 
to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the 
DOI, who in turn delegated authority to the Manager of the BLM’s OCS 
Office.17 The OCSLA regulations made the BLM responsible for 
overseeing activities up to the point of lease issuance and, thereafter, for 
royalty collection from oil and gas activities.18 Separately, the 
Conservation Division of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
was responsible for supervising energy production and exploration 
activities and for overseeing lessees after leases were issued.19 
                                                                                                             
 13. 43 U.S.C. §1332(4)–(5); see also 43 U.S.C. §1345. 
 14. See Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *2 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 14, 2006) (“[T]he Secretary is required to consider and balance the potential 
for environmental harm, the potential for adverse impact to the coastal zone, and the 
potential for the discovery of resources, while also ensuring the public a fair and 
equitable return on the resources of the OCS.”). 
 15. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (2012). 
 16. See Chapter II-Geological Survey, 19 Fed. Reg. 2655 (May 8, 1954); Chapter 
I-Bureau of Land Management, 19 Fed. Reg. 2661 (May 8, 1954). 
 17. See Amendments to Delegations of Authority with Respect to Mineral 
Leases, 18 Fed. Reg. 6126 (Sept. 23, 1954); Delegation of Authority with Respect to 
Mineral Leases, 19 Fed. Reg. 6720 (Oct. 19, 1954). 
 18. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 63. 
 19. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 
C.F.R. § 250.10–.11 (1959); Delegation of Authority with Respect to Development 
and Leasing of Minerals in Submerged Lands, 18 Fed. Reg. 5715 (1953); Nat’l 
Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 63; James, supra note 5, at 179 n.20. 
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Between 1953 and 1968, regulators under the OCSLA conducted 
twenty-three lease sales.20 The offshore energy industry grew during this 
time, as the OCS increasingly became a crucial source of domestic oil and 
gas resources.21 The API continued to evolve as well, moving its offices to 
Washington, D.C. by the end of the 1960s.22 
B. The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Amendments of 1978 
On January 28, 1969, a drilling rig blowout in the Santa Barbara 
Channel resulted in an oil spill estimated at up to 100,000 barrels—at the 
time, the largest oil spill in United States history.23 Within ten days, DOI 
regulators suspended all activities on leases off the coast of California near 
the area of the blowout.24 The suspension was supposed to last until 
environmental studies could be conducted to inform the next course of 
action, but the Santa Barbara oil spill was followed by blowouts in the 
Gulf of Mexico in February and December of 1970, and, in September of 
1971, the Secretary announced that the California suspension would not 
be lifted.25 This led to a challenge brought by oil companies in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the 
Secretary’s authority under the OCSLA to suspend operations—but not 
indefinitely, without triggering a takings claim.26 
Meanwhile, the DOI undertook substantial revisions to its OCSLA 
regulations. It issued orders implementing new rules for testing safety 
equipment and began to require prior approval of plans and equipment used 
in exploration and production activities.27 The API participated actively in the 
issuance of these orders, and itself undertook a number of actions, including 
drafting recommended practice guidance documents and facilitating the 
sharing of technological innovations among offshore operators.28 But the 
most significant outcomes from the Santa Barbara oil spill were the major 
congressional actions it provoked, including the National Environmental 
                                                                                                             
 20. James, supra note 5, at 179. 
 21. See API History, supra note 5. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 28; James, supra note 5, at 180. 
 24. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 29; James, supra note 5, at 180. 
25. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 29–30; James, supra note 5, at 180. 
 26. See Union Oil of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 751–52 (9th Cir. 1975); Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 146–48 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 27. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 30, 58. The USGS also increased its 
scope of enforcement by revamping its inspection program and dramatically 
increasing the number of USGS inspectors and engineers. Id. at 30. 
 28. Id. 
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Protection Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), and the 
1978 Amendments to the OCSLA (the 1978 Amendments).29 
1. The National Environmental Policy Act 
Signed into law on New Year’s Day in 1970, NEPA had lofty 
environmental goals, and early litigation soon ensured that the statute would 
play a central role in mandating the consideration of environmental 
consequences for federal actions.30 NEPA requires that all federal agencies 
include a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for any “major 
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”31 In addition to an assessment of the “environmental impact of 
the proposed action,” the EIS must include an assessment of any unavoidable 
adverse environmental effects of the action, alternatives to the proposed action 
(including no action), consideration of short-term versus long-term 
consequences, and any “irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources” the action would require.32 
Certain federal actions are not subject to the full EIS review and require 
only an abbreviated review known as an Environmental Assessment (EA).33 
If the EA process does not identify a significant impact of the federal action, 
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), and the 
environmental review process ends.34 Alternatively, some federal actions are 
                                                                                                             
 29. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). 
 30. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 59 n.23, n.26. 
NEPA “declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in 
cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private 
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and 
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, 
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Americans.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
 31. 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 32. Id.; see, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 
66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Regulations implementing NEPA . . . require that an agency 
developing an EIS evaluate ‘all reasonable alternatives,’ including a no-action 
alternative.”). 
 33. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3–.4, 1508.9 (2015); see also Blanco v. Burton, 2006 
WL 2366046, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006). The Council on Environmental Quality 
is the federal agency with authority to promulgate regulations under NEPA, which are 
found at 40 C.F.R. §1500.1–.6. 
 34. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
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exempted from the EIS process as “categorical exclusions,” although these 
have limited applicability on the OCS.35 
The NEPA review process does not mandate any particular outcome (that 
is, the agency is under no obligation to select the most environmentally 
beneficial alternative), but the process does require a thorough (and time- and 
resource-consuming) review and consideration of environmental impacts.36 
2. The Coastal Zone Management Act 
Another major piece of federal legislation provoked by the Santa 
Barbara spill, the CZMA, applies to all coastal states that elect to 
participate in developing a coastal resource plan and confers review 
authority onto those that do, with the goal of resolving conflicts between 
state and federal entities over coastal resources.37 The CZMA provided 
grants to coastal states to enable the states to develop and implement 
management programs to protect natural resources.38 Once the Secretary 
of Commerce approves a state’s management program, federal activities 
that affect the state’s coastal zone must “be carried out in a manner which 
is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable 
policies of the State management program[],” and states gain the right to 
review certain federal actions for consistency with the state’s coastal 
management plan.39 With respect to the OCS leasing program, applicants 
for federal licenses or permits affecting a state’s coastal zone or its 
resources must provide certification that the proposed activity complies 
and is consistent with the state’s management program; this requirement 
is generally referred to as a “consistency determination.”40 States’ rights 
                                                                                                             
 35. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4; see, e.g., Notice of Intent to Conduct a Review of 
Categorical Exclusions for Outer Continental Shelf Decisions, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,418 
(Oct. 8, 2010); Categorical Exclusion Reviews, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
http://www.boem.gov/Environmental-Stewardship/Environmental-Assessment 
/NEPA/policy/ce/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2015); see also Nat’l Comm’n 
Report, supra note 1, at 81. 
 36. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 
(1989); Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006). 
 37. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454–1456 (2012); see also James, supra note 5, at 182–
83. 
 38. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455. 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A); see James, supra note 5, at 183. 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c); see e.g., Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 14, 2006). Regulations under the CZMA were not promulgated until several 
years after the statute went into effect, but the CZMA nevertheless “initially served as 
the primary program for ensuring against undue risk to . . . marine and coastal 
resources” because these considerations were not fully integrated into the OCSLA 
until passage of the 1978 Amendments. See Sam Kalen, The BP Macondo Well 
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under the CZMA are tempered by the federal government’s ultimate 
authority to effectively overrule a state’s (in)consistency determination.41 
3. The OCSLA’s 1978 Amendments 
Forged by the competing pressures of environmental concerns and the 
perceived need to streamline access to domestic oil and gas in response to the 
oil embargo and energy crisis of the 1970s, the OCSLA leasing process took 
its current form with the 1978 Amendments.42 The 1978 Amendments put in 
place a leasing process with four main phases: (1) preparation of a five-year 
leasing plan, (2) the lease sale, (3) exploration, and (4) development and 
production.43 In the first phase, the Secretary prepares the leasing plan, which 
includes a selection of proposed lease locations and a schedule of proposed 
lease sales that will, in the Secretary’s determination, best meet the nation’s 
energy needs within a five-year plan period.44 Second, the agency calls for, 
accepts, and evaluates nominations for potential lease areas, then publishes a 
recommended list in advance of the proposed lease sale date.45 The Secretary 
then grants leases, on terms set by the agency, to the highest qualified 
                                                                                                             
Exploration Plan: Wither the Coastal Zone Management Act?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11079, 11080 (2010). 
 41. Lynn S. Sletto, Piecemeal Legislative Proposals: An Inappropriate 
Approach to Managing Offshore Oil Drilling, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 557, 562 
(2003); see also Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11 (“If the state objects, a federal 
agency may proceed with its proposed activity only if it has concluded that 
consistency with the enforceable policies of the state's management program is 
prohibited by existing law applicable to the federal agency, and has described to the 
state, in writing, the legal impediments to full consistency with the state's policies; or 
if it determines that its activity is fully consistent with the state's enforceable 
policies.”). 
 42. See James, supra note 5 at 185–87. Up to the time of the Santa Barbara oil 
spill, disputes over oil and gas development on the OCS had centered on who had the 
right to revenues from mineral resources, and not on whether or how to develop those 
resources, or how environmental and safety considerations should factor into those 
decisions. Mark Davis, Lessons Unlearned: The Legal and Policy Legacy of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Spill, 3 WASH. & LEE. J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 155, 168 
(2012); James, supra note 5, at 179, 181, 185. The Santa Barbara oil spill and other 
events captured the public’s attention and inspired a series of environmental 
legislation in the 1970s. See James, supra note 5, at 181; see also note 62, infra. The 
passage of NEPA in 1969, CZMA in 1972, and the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA 
renewed the emphasis on safety and environmental protection, in addition to 
increasing the emphasis placed on states’ roles in the leasing process. See 43 U.S.C. 
§1802 (2012); see also James, supra note 5, at 186–87. At the same time, the oil 
embargo and energy shortage of the early 1970s brought urgency to the development 
of domestic oil and gas resources, and OCS leasing was viewed as a key component 
of United States energy independence. See James, supra note 5, at 185. 
 43. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, 1351. 
 44. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
 45. 43 U.S.C. § 1337. 
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bidders.46 In the third phase, lessees submit exploration plans, with 
details of proposed well locations, activities, and equipment, for 
evaluation and approval.47 In the fourth phase, lessees submit 
development and production plans for approval.48 The policies of the 
OCSLA are woven into its directives, mandating the factors that the 
Secretary must consider during each phase.49 
The 1978 Amendments also revised the guidelines for health, safety, 
and environmental (HS&E) regulations. The OCSLA deploys a “best 
available and safest technologies” (BAST) standard for all technologies 
for drilling operations conducted on rigs and other installations.50 The 
BAST standard encapsulates the three OCSLA policies of environment, 
development, and national and state interests by requiring technologies 
“to be economically feasible, wherever equipment failure would have a 
significant effect on safety, health, or the environment, except where the 
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient 
to justify the incremental costs of utilizing such technologies.”51 Lessees 
and permit holders must also conduct operations within the leased or 
permitted area “in compliance with regulations intended to protect 
persons, property, and the environment on the [OCS].”52 The regulators’ 
enforcement authority allows for onsite inspections to ensure compliance 
with environmental and safety regulations.53 
NEPA and the CZMA are integrated into the OCSLA leasing 
process, which requires consideration of both environmental impacts 
under NEPA and state coastal management plans under the CZMA. In 
the five-year plan phase, which is considered a “major federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” under 
NEPA, the Secretary must conduct an EIS.54 OCSLA regulations also 
require NEPA analysis during the lease sale stage; at this phase, 
however, the agency conducts only a more limited EA before 
recommending the list of areas to be leased.55 The OCSLA effectively 
deems at least the first development and production plan in any OCS 
planning area (other than in the western and central Gulf of Mexico, 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. 
 47. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c). 
 48. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (2012). 
 49. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1344(a)(1), 1344(a)(3), 1346. 
 50. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a)(1), 1347(b). 
 51. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 
 52. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(2); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(1). 
 53. See 43 U.S.C. § 1348 (1998). 
 54. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 
865 F.2d 288, 295–97 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 55. See 30 C.F.R. § 556.0 (2015). 
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where extensive development activities have already occurred) to be a 
major federal action requiring the agency to conduct a full EIS at least 
once per area.56 Thus, during the exploration and development and 
production phases, regulators conduct NEPA analyses—or at least 
review and reconsider the analyses conducted during prior phases.57 
Likewise, the OCSLA expressly invokes CZMA compliance, 
requiring the implementing agency to submit exploration plans for 
review by the applicable state’s Coastal Zone Management agency and, 
if necessary, to account for any state objections to the plan.58 The 
exploration plans require a consistency certification from any affected 
state unless the Secretary of Commerce makes a contrary consistency 
determination or otherwise determines that the plan serves the interests 
of national security.59 States also have authority under the CZMA to 
review and comment on development and production plans, to identify 
relevant legal and other factors for the Secretary to consider during the 
leasing process, and to submit comments on the leasing program that the 
Secretary is required—within certain bounds—to accept.60 Although 
inherent tension exists between the environmental focus of the CZMA 
and NEPA and the expeditious development directives of the OCSLA, 
the 1978 Amendments attempted to bind these goals together, at least 
procedurally, within certain OCS leasing steps.61 
                                                                                                             
 56. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND 
GAS DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 12 (2014). 
 57. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (2015); 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.232, 550.269; James, supra 
note 5, at 192; VANN, supra note 56, at 12. 
 58. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351; see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.226, 550.232, 550.235 
(2015). 
 59. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351; 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1992). 
 60. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1345, 1351; see also 30 C.F.R. § 550.267. 
 61. See, e.g., James, supra note 5, at 194 (“The overriding concern of the 
Secretary of Commerce under the CZMA is protection of the coastal environment 
from adverse impact caused by OCS development. On the other hand, the Secretary 
of the Interior’s concern under the [the OCSLA] is to proceed with development of 
the [OCS] while minimizing environmental impacts. As a result, the two secretaries 
are empowered to make decisions regarding the same subject matter under separate 
acts whose objectives are not entirely consistent.”). 
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Legislation to resolve such conflicting goals and directives was 
characteristic of the approach taken towards the OCS in the 1970s. 
Responses to the Santa Barbara oil spill and other environmental 
concerns during the 1970s were overwhelmingly addressed through 
congressional action, with litigation often leading to further legislative 
enactments.62 Regulations played neither a primary nor a direct role in 
shaping the OCSLA regulatory scheme; instead, Congress often resolved 
the interplay among the OCSLA, NEPA, and the CZMA through 
legislative amendments. 
C. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
The 1978 Amendments also introduced liability for offshore facility 
owners and operators, remedies for parties with economic losses due to 
oil spills, and an Oil Spill Liability Fund as an alternative for recovery.63 
These liability issues became the renewed focus of legislative action, 
mainly with regard to vessels, after the Exxon Valdez tanker grounded 
on March 24, 1989, spilling approximately eleven million barrels of oil 
into Alaska’s Prince William Sound.64 In response to the Exxon Valdez 
spill and three other oil spills that followed in rapid succession in United 
States waters, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) 
quickly and nearly unanimously, introducing a new comprehensive oil 
spill liability scheme that requires “responsible parties” to pay for a broad 
                                                                                                             
 62. Other environmental legislation enacted in the same decade included the 
Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7431 (1970); the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (1972); the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1361–1423h (1972); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973); 
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (1974); the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (1976); the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (1976); the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801–1891d (1976); the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (1976); the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (1977); and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (1980). 
 63. James, supra note 5, at 201–02. 
 64. See Davis, supra note 42, at 163. 
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range of oil spill-related costs.65 Elements of the new liability scheme had 
been on the table for fifteen years at the time, but were only enacted into 
legislation following the Exxon Valdez oil spill.66 
In addition to establishing a new oil spill liability scheme and recovery 
fund, OPA’s main provisions address technology, planning for oil spills, and 
management of oil spill responses.67 OPA mandates specific technology 
requirements, notably for double hulls in tankers.68 OPA also calls for worst-
case scenario planning for oil spills at multiple spatial scales ranging from 
national to facility-specific.69 
Although OPA is primarily concerned with vessels carrying oil, certain 
provisions apply to offshore facilities, and responsible parties include the 
owners and operators of those facilities.70 Responsible parties for offshore 
facilities, like responsible parties for vessels, are required to maintain 
evidence of financial responsibility up to the statutory applicable maximum 
liability amount.71 
DOI regulators also assume responsibility for certain OPA requirements, 
including planning with respect to offshore facility-specific response plans 
and some oil spill response activities.72 These regulations detail the 
requirements for facility-specific response plans, and the regulators’ authority 
                                                                                                             
 65. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702; Robert Force, Martin Davies, and Joshua S. Force, 
Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and 
State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TULANE L. REV. 889, 893 (2011); John Wyeth 
Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 Energy L.J. 57, 59–60 (2011); Gaia J. Larsen, 
Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to 
Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL L. J. 139, 151 (2012); 
Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster: Business 
as Usual or Sea Change?, 36 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L L. 147, 151 (2014). The other oil 
spills occurred three months after the Exxon Valdez spill (all within a twenty-four hour 
period) in Rhode Island coastal waters, the Delaware River, and the Houston Ship 
Channel. S. REP. 101-94, 2, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723. 
 66. Griggs, supra note 65, at 59. The Exxon Valdez oil spill also resulted, at least 
temporarily, in increased funding allocated to research and development for oil spill 
prevention technologies. Larsen, supra note 65, at 12. 
 67. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321; see also Griggs, supra note 65, at 59; Andrew Hartsig, 
Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL 
L. J. 269, 280; JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL 
SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND AND GOVERNANCE 13-16 (2012). 
 68. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (2015); see also Ramseur, supra note 67, at 13. 
 69. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1321; see also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 280–81. 
 70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f); see also Weaver, supra note 65, at 151 n.19. 
 71. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716. 
 72. See 30 C.F.R. part 254; see also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 281-83; Nat’l 
Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 83. Agency responsibilities under OPA have been 
augmented via a series of Executive Orders and Memoranda of Understanding. 
Ramseur, supra note 67, at 21. Following reorganization of the MMS, the DOI agency 
currently assuming these responsibilities is BSEE, as addressed infra. 
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extends to determining what constitutes a worst-case scenario and what 
response is adequate.73 
A relatively new agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), 
became responsible for the additional duties imposed by OPA. In 1982, prior 
to OPA’s passage, Secretary of the Interior James Watt had overhauled the 
regulatory structure overseeing OCSLA administration.74 Via Secretarial 
Order, Secretary Watt created the MMS as a new entity to take over the full 
suite of OCSLA leasing, enforcement, and revenue collection responsibilities 
previously shared between the BLM and USGS.75 Within the new MMS, 
these roles were divided between the Offshore Energy and Minerals 
Management program and the Minerals Revenue Management program.76 
Shortly after its creation, the MMS oversaw an ambitious five-year leasing 
plan that set an initial goal of leasing nearly one billion acres in federal 
waters.77 Because congressionally-issued moratoriums limited the areas 
available for lease to only the Gulf of Mexico and parts of Alaska, the scope 
of the five-year plan was not realized.78 However, Secretary Watt’s innovation 
of offering area-wide leases (rather than leases of only individual tracts) 
became—and remains—a part of the OCS leasing scheme.79 
In the years prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the MMS had begun to 
study and consider revising its safety program. Alarmed by catastrophic 
and deadly sinkings of offshore facilities off the coasts of Norway and 
Canada and production platform explosions off the coasts of Scotland and 
Louisiana, all of which took place in the 1980s, the MMS “had come to 
appreciate that a command and control, prescriptive approach to regulation 
did not adequately address the risks generated by the offshore industry’s 
                                                                                                             
 73. 30 C.F.R. § 254.21 (2015); see Davis, supra note 42, at 166. 
 74. See Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982). 
 75. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982); Dep’t of the 
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 Amendment No. 1 (May 10, 1982); Dep’t of the 
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 Amendment No. 2 (May 26, 1982); Dep’t of the 
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3087 (Dec. 3, 1982); Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial 
Order No. 3087 Amendment No. 2 (Feb. 7, 1983); see Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra 
note 1, at 63–64. 
 76. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 65. 
 77. Davis, supra note 42, at 169. 
 78. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 65–67. 
 79. Id. In the area of HS&E, the MMS also promulgated “an array of prescriptive 
safety regulations: hundreds of pages of technical requirements for pollution 
prevention and control, drilling, well-completion operations, oil and gas well-
workovers (major well maintenance), production safety systems, platforms and 
structures, pipelines, well production, and well-control and -production safety 
training.” Id. at 68; see 30 C.F.R. Part 250. The MMS already had responsibility for 
annual and unscheduled inspections of operations, partly for the purpose of overseeing 
these safety requirements, before OPA added oil spill response planning to its 
responsibilities. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 68. 
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new technologies and exploration, development and production activities, 
including industrial expansion into deeper waters.”80 Regulators in other 
countries began to adopt risk-based approaches that could generate 
positive feedback loops in safety policies and practices, rather than a 
“prescriptive regulation and inspection model,” and the MMS began to 
consider such a shift in its approach to HS&E regulation as well.81 
The central features of these risk-based approaches are industry-
driven risk assessments, paired with systematic risk management 
procedures, and backstopped with—rather than driven by—specific 
minimum safety standards.82 In the 1980s, an internal MMS task force and 
the National Research Council’s Marine Board studied MMS safety 
procedures at the agency’s request and recommended that the MMS focus 
on identifying and combatting safety risks and circumstances, 
“particularly those involving human factors, operational procedures, and 
modification of equipment and facilities,” and on employing inspections 
in order to systematically identify risks rather than continuing to focus on 
noncompliance by means of regulatory specifications.83 Although these 
recommendations had already been made at the time of OPA’s enactment, 
none were incorporated into the new legislation.84 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 68–70. The Alexander Kielland, a rig and offshore housing structure, 
capsized off the coast of Norway in 1980, and the Ocean Ranger sank off the coast of 
Canada in 1982. Explosions occurred at the Piper Alpha platform off the coast of 
Scotland in 1988 and on a platform off the coast of Louisiana in South Pass Block 60 
in 1989. Collectively, the accidents accounted for hundreds of fatalities. Id. 
 81. Id. at 69. 
 82. Id. (“Under the new safety-management model, minimum standards for 
structural and operational integrity (well control, prevention of fires and explosions, 
and worker safety) remained in place. But the new burden now rested on industry to 
assess the risks associated with offshore activities and demonstrate that each facility 
had the policies, plans, and systems in place to manage those risks.”) 
 83. See id. at 70 (citing Marine Bd. of the Nat’l Research Council Comm. on 
Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for 
Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: Nat’l Acad. Press, 1990) 
3, available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1). 
 84. Id. (“Ironically, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, but failed to 
address any of the regulatory deficiencies identified by the Marine Board, while 
adding to MMS’s regulatory responsibilities.”). 
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D. The OCS Regulatory Scheme in Place at the Time of the Macondo 
Event: SEMS Proposals Are Still Not Formalized 
In April 2010—the month of the Macondo event—the OCS regulatory 
scheme and the overall framework of environmental laws and regulations 
reflected the evolving response to the Santa Barbara and Exxon Valdez oil 
spills.85 The tensions among the three central policies of the OCSLA were 
counterbalanced by new legislation. The 1978 Amendments and the CZMA 
augmented states’ roles, while NEPA, OPA, and other environmental 
legislation added to OCLSA’s environmental protections. All the while, the 
offshore energy industry continued to grow, especially in the western Gulf of 
Mexico, and the MMS focused on regulation and revenue collection. 
The MMS characterized its own scheme as having “both prescriptive and 
performance elements” and continued to take initial steps toward developing 
its HS&E regulations during the 1990s and early 2000s.86 In 1991, the MMS 
published a notice requesting comments on “alternative strategies to promote 
safety and environmental protection, specifically a requirement that outer 
continental shelf lessees and/or operators develop, maintain, and implement 
‘a safety and environmental management program.’”87 No SEMS regulations 
materialized from this call for comments, or from an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking in 2006, or from a proposed rulemaking in 2009 that 
would have implemented some elements of a SEMS approach on the OCS.88 
                                                                                                             
 85. See Griggs, supra note 65, at 59. Over the same time span, there was a general 
increase in legislation providing greater worker and environmental protections—
including several federal statutes governing the OCS. Davis, supra note 42, at 173 
(referencing NEPA, the Clean Water Act, the CZMA, the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA, and OPA). 
 86. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)–Safety 
and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,277, 29,277 (May 22, 
2006). 
 87. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71. 
 88. See Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. at 29,277; 
Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental Shelf Oil and 
Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639 (June 17, 2009); see also Nat’l Comm’n Report, 
supra note 1, at 72. 
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Thus at the time of the Macondo event, the MMS’s partially prescriptive 
system included some HS&E regulations and an inspection program, but 
operators could still choose whether to adopt a SEMS plan.89 In 2009, nearly 
half of the operators on the OCS had not yet done so.90 In the absence of 
formal MMS action on SEMS, the API had developed its own “recommended 
practice” safety guidance documents, along with a suite of standards, reports, 
studies, and technical publications that were widely used by the offshore 
industry.91 In practice, the API assumed “a dominant role in developing safety 
standards for the oil and gas industry.”92 
II. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
The blowout of the Macondo well on April 20, 2010 led to the latest 
revamping of the OCS regulatory scheme.93 It resulted in eleven worker 
deaths, an oil spill estimated at nearly five million barrels discharged into the 
Gulf of Mexico, and massive response and cleanup efforts.94 Unlike the Santa 
Barbara and Exxon Valdez oil spills, however, the Macondo event has not 
sparked any significant congressional action to reshape regulation of the 
OCS.95 Instead, the response has been primarily executive and regulatory, 
including moratoriums, increased enforcement efforts, the reorganization of 
the regulatory agency, and a series of new rules on workplace safety and 
                                                                                                             
 89. E.g., Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
29,277; see also Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71 (“At the time of the 
Macondo blowout – almost 20 years after [MMS’s original proposal to develop 
SEMS] – MMS had still not published a rule mandating that all operators have plans 
to manage safety and environmental risks. The agency’s efforts to adopt a more 
rigorous and effective risk-based safety regulatory regime were repeatedly revised, 
refined, delayed, and blocked alternatively by industry or skeptical agency political 
appointees. MMS thus never achieved the reform of its regulatory oversight of drilling 
safety consonant with practices that most other countries had embraced decades 
earlier.”). 
 90. Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster: 
The Role of the Regulator, 36 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L L. 379, 409 (2014). 
 91. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71, 225, 228. 
 92. Id. at 225. 
 93. Id. at vi. 
 94. Id. at vi, 211 n.76. 
 95. E.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42942, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: RECENT ACTIVITIES AND ONGOING 
DEVELOPMENTS 13–15 (2015). 
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training, blowout prevention, well design, and drilling safety.96 This section 
provides a brief overview of some of these reforms, focusing primarily on the 
SEMS rules. 
In immediate response to the Macondo event, Secretary of the Interior 
Ken Salazar halted deepwater drilling activities in the Gulf of Mexico by 
imposing a moratorium, which was issued on May 28, 2010 and was intended 
to last six months.97 However, oil and gas services providers succeeded in 
enjoining the moratorium on June 22, 2010.98 The Secretary then rescinded 
the initial moratorium and on July 12, 2010 issued a second moratorium that 
was intended to remain in place until November 30, 2010 “or until such earlier 
time that the Secretary determines that deepwater drilling operations can 
proceed safely.”99 The Secretary also announced that interim safety rules 
would be issued and implemented during this time.100 The second moratorium 
was lifted on October 12, 2010, and the initial SEMS regulations were 
published in the Federal Register three days later.101 The first new drilling 
permit issued after the moratorium was not approved until February 28, 
2011.102 
                                                                                                             
 96. See Dep’t of the Interior, Reforms since the Deepwater Horizon Tragedy, 
available at http://www.boem.gov/Reforms-since-the-Deepwater-Horizon-Tragedy/; 
Joint Industry Offshore Operating Procedures and Equipment Task Force, Final 
Report on Industry Recommendations to Improve Offshore Operating Procedures 
and Equipment 2 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-
and-natural-gas/exploration/offshore/prevention-final-report-031312.pdf [hereinafter 
JITF Report]. 
 97. Decision Memorandum for the Secretary from the Director of the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 1-2 (Oct. 1, 2010). 
 98. See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630–32 
(E.D. La. 2010). 
 99. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Salazar Issues New Suspensions 
to Guide Safe Pause on Deepwater Drilling: Bromwich to Engage Public, Industry 
and Stakeholders in Deepwater Drilling Safety Reforms (July 12, 2010), available at 
https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Secretary-Salazar-Issues-New-Suspensions-
to-Guide-Safe-Pause-on-Deepwater-Drilling. 
 100. Id. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE) issued NTL No. 2010-N05 on June 8, 2010 in order to immediately 
implement some initial safety measures. 
 101. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct. 15, 
2010); Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to 
Michael R. Bromwich, Dir. of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation, & 
Enforcement (BOEMRE) 1 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov 
/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-Drilling-May-Resume-for-Operators-Who- 
Clear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-Environmental-Protection.cfm. 
 102. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation, & Enforcement, 
BOEMRE Approves First Deepwater Drilling Permit To Meet Important New Safety 
Standards in Gulf of Mexico (Feb. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011/press0228.aspx. 
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Reorganization of the MMS’s responsibilities and structure was similarly 
swift. Within three weeks of the Macondo event, Secretary Salazar stripped 
the MMS of its enforcement responsibilities and, one week after that, 
announced a restructuring of the MMS into three new agencies, each taking 
on a subset of the range of functions that had previously been handled by the 
MMS.103 This reorganization would ultimately result in the creation of the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources 
Revenue (ONRR).104 Secretary Salazar’s justification for the restructuring 
echoed the OCSLA policies—it had the goals of “improv[ing] the 
management, oversight, and accountability of activities on the Outer 
Continental Shelf; ensur[ing] a fair return to the taxpayer from royalty and 
revenue collection and disbursement activities; and provid[ing] independent 
safety and environmental oversight and enforcement of offshore activities.”105 
Though accomplished quickly, this reorganization was an idea that had been 
considered before the Macondo event; DOI and congressional studies had 
already recommended MMS restructuring years earlier.106 
Within months of the Macondo event, the DOI began formal 
rulemaking on a number of subjects—a process that is still ongoing. 
Rulemaking efforts have included final rules on safety measures, SEMS, 
and OPA liability limits for offshore facilities, as well as proposed rules 
for exploration activities in the Arctic, blowout preventers and other 
                                                                                                             
 103. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 55 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental Protection Reforms to 
Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-
Environmental-Protection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-
Gas-Operations.cfm [perma.cc/H4G6-927C]); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010), 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-
Missions.cfm [perma.cc/AK6H-PABS]; Sec’y of the Interior, Establishment of the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, No. 3299 (May 19, 
2010), http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ [perma.cc/RT6R-HQRA]. 
 104. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 55 n.2. ONRR functions were 
separated on October 1, 2010, and, until BOEM and BSEE structures were in place, 
the residual roles of the MMS were handled by an interim organization, BOEMRE. 
See Order No. 3302, Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, Change the Name of the 
Minerals Management Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement, available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/0/doc/165 
/Page1.aspx. 
 105. Order No. 3299, Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, Establishment of the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010). 
 106. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 11. 
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drilling procedures, and the regulation of dispersants.107 In addition, within 
five years of the Macondo event, BSEE issued forty Notices to Lessees 
and Operators (NTLs) to offer agency guidance and interpretation outside 
the formal rulemaking process, including one NTL that provisionally 
implemented new safety measures until the SEMS and other new safety 
rules could be fully put in place.108 
In contrast to the flurry of regulatory activity—and despite more than 
sixty congressional hearings held and more than 150 legislative proposals put 
forth in the 111th Congress alone—federal legislation in response to the 
Macondo event has been minimal.109 Although a few pieces of legislation 
related to oil spills have been enacted, HS&E subjects have been addressed 
only in isolated provisions; and no legislation has taken on these subjects 
comprehensively.110 The most significant legislative proposal related to these 
                                                                                                             
 107. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Increased 
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14, 2010); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer 
Continental Shelf–Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 
63,609 (Oct. 15, 2010); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental 
Shelf—Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems,77 Fed. Reg. 
50,856 (Aug. 22, 2012); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental 
Shelf–Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
20,423 (Apr. 5, 2013); Consumer Price Index Adjustments of the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 Limit of Liability for Offshore Facilities,79 Fed. Reg. 73,832 (Dec. 12, 2014); 
Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements 
for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9916 
(Feb. 24, 2015). 
 108. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 11. These NTLs “are formal documents that 
provide clarification, description, or interpretation of a regulation or OCS standard; 
provide guidelines on the implementation of a special lease stipulation or regional 
requirement; provide a better understanding of the scope and meaning of a regulation 
by explaining BSEE interpretation of a requirement; or transmit administrative 
information such as current telephone listings and a change in BSEE personnel or 
office address.” BSEE, Notices, Letters, and Information to Lessees and Operators 
(NTLs), http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Notices-to-Lessees/index/ 
[perma.cc/YU6R-ZQTN] (last visited July 5, 2015). NTLs are utilized by other DOI 
agencies as well. See Blair Klein, Notices to Lessees Under Federal Leases, 
Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Twenty-Fifth Annual Institute (1979). 
 109. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 4–5. 
 110. See id. at 13–15. More than five years after the Macondo event, only one such 
piece of federal legislation had been enacted—the RESTORE Act. See id, at 4–5. 
Passed in 2012 as part of P.L. 112-141, the “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st 
Century Act” or the “MAP–21 Act,” the RESTORE Act established a Gulf Coast 
Restoration Fund in the General Treasury, into which eighty percent of certain Clean 
Water Act Section 311 penalties are to be paid by the Macondo event’s responsible 
parties. See H.R. 4348, 112th Cong. §1602 (2012). Funds are distributed to a number 
of entities focused on designated restoration and related activities in the Gulf states 
affected by the oil spill. Ramseur, supra note 95, at 5. 
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concerns was the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources 
(CLEAR) Act, which passed the House but not the Senate.111 The CLEAR 
Act included a number of HS&E-related provisions: mandatory SEMS for 
OCS operations, equipment safety standards and inspection and certification 
requirements for blowout preventers, and well cementing performance 
requirements.112 Nevertheless, some provisions of the CLEAR Act, such as 
the replacement of the MMS with three new bureaus, were implemented 
directly by DOI regulation, bypassing the legislative process.113 
A. Key Provisions of the SEMS Regulations 
An interim final rule published on October 14, 2010 put certain 
safety measures in place.114 The final rule on Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems (the Workplace Safety Rule) was published on 
October 15, 2010, just short of six months after the Macondo event.115 
This rule included many of the same provisions that had stalled at the 
proposed rulemaking stage four years earlier.116 It was followed by a 
notice of proposed rulemaking, published September 14, 2011 and made 
final on April 5, 2013, for a rule (SEMS II) to “provid[e] greater 
protection by supplementing operators’ SEMS programs with employee 
training, empowering field level personnel with safety management 
decisions and strengthening auditing procedures by requiring them to be 
completed by independent third parties.”117 SEMS II “supplements the 
requirements in [API’s Recommended Practice 75 (API RP 75)] to 
ensure that all companies are implementing current best practices and 
                                                                                                             
 111. See Griggs, supra note 65, at 76. Similarly, the “Blowout Prevention Act of 
2010,” including a repeal of liability limits and other revisions to OPA, passed the 
House but failed to emerge from a Senate committee. See id. at 76. 
 112. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, 
111th Cong. §§ 102, 205; see also Griggs, supra note 65, at 77 n.141. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Increased 
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
 115.  Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Safety 
and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,609 (Oct. 15, 2010) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); see also SEMS Fact Sheet, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance 
/Safety-and-Environmental-Management-Systems---SEMS/Fact-Sheet/ 
[https://perma.cc/DRV6-24YA] (last visited July 6, 2015). 
 116. See Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610; 
see also Ramseur, supra note 95, at 12 n.56. 
 117. See BSEE, supra note 115. 
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establishing well-functioning SEMS programs.”118 The SEMS II rule 
required operators on the OCS to submit their first audits by November 
15, 2013 and to conduct audits in compliance with the rule by June 4, 
2015.119 
The Workplace Safety Rule thus makes SEMS mandatory for the 
first time on the OCS.120 It incorporates by reference all thirteen elements 
of API RP 75, as well as some additional requirements.121 The Workplace 
Safety Rule, as applied to offshore facilities, requires operators to: 
assemble safety and environmental information, assess facility-level risk 
through a hazards analysis, implement a program to manage facility or 
operations changes, establish safe work practices, conduct safety and 
technical training for employees and contractors, maintain mechanical 
integrity, conduct pre-startup reviews of all systems, develop emergency 
response and control plans and procedures for incident investigations, 
maintain SEMS program documentation, and conduct internal audits at 
regular intervals.122 
SEMS II augments the Workplace Safety Rule’s requirements and 
adds details.123 Several of the elements added by the SEMS II rule focus 
on “key ways for personnel to help ensure safe performance of oil and 
gas activities on the OCS.”124 SEMS II requires facilities to establish stop 
work authority (SWA) and ultimate work authority (UWA) procedures 
aimed at authorizing any personnel to stop potentially dangerous 
activities and clarifying who has decision-making authority, 
respectively.125 SWA makes it the responsibility of any individual to stop 
work being done at a facility if that person witnesses an activity “creating 
imminent risk or danger.”126 The procedures outlining a facility’s SWA 
                                                                                                             
 118. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423, 
20,424 (Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
 119. See Bureau of Safety and Envt’l Enforcement, Interim Policy Document: 
Safety and Environmental Management Systems Implementation, IPD No. 2013-01 
(effective Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://www.bsee.gov/WorkArea 
/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=36507222399. 
 120. Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610; see 
also SEMS Fact Sheet, supra note 115. 
 121. Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610. 
 122. See SEMS Fact Sheet, supra note 115. 
 123. See Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 20,424. 
 124.  Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 20,424. 
 125. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1930, 250.1931 (2015); see also Revisions to Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424. 
 126. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1930(a); see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424. 
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program must be presented at every orientation and reviewed at every 
safety meeting.127 UWA procedures set forth the “requirements 
establishing who has UWA on the facility for operational safety and 
decision-making at any given time.”128 The SWA and UWA procedures 
are intended to dovetail, so that once a person witnesses an immediate 
risk and exercises SWA, resulting in a work stoppage, the person with 
UWA then determines whether the risk has been resolved such that work 
can resume.129 
In addition, SEMS II requires that an independent accredited auditor 
conduct audits of the SEMS program’s effectiveness.130 Specifically, the 
regulations require facilities to conduct audits meeting the specified APR 
RP 75 requirements and using an Audit Service Provider (ASP) that is 
accredited by a BSEE-approved Accreditation Body (AB).131 
Qualifications for these ASPs and ABs are largely set forth in API 
publications incorporated by reference into the regulations.132 Under this 
program, an audit team led by an independent ASP—not BSEE —will 
perform audits of each SEMS program on a three-year cycle.133 BSEE’s 
role in the auditing process is to approve the ABs that in turn accredit the 
ASPs.134 
B. Health, Safety, and Environment Regulations Before and After the 
Macondo Event 
The SEMS regulations in some ways represent a departure from the 
OCS regulatory scheme in existence prior to the Macondo event. BSEE 
envisions the SEMS program as “the cornerstone of BSEE’s move 
toward a hybrid regulatory approach” that will “focus both industry’s 
                                                                                                             
 127. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1930(e); see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,431. 
 128. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. 
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 129. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
20,431. 
 130. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1920; see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,424. 
 131. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1920, 250.1921 (2015). 
 132. See id. §§ 250.1921, 250.1922. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 20,430. In response to a comment to the proposed rule, BSEE clarified that only the 
leaders of the audit team must be ASP employees, representatives, or agents. 
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,430. 
The remaining members of the audit team can be operator personnel in order to allow 
the operator “flexibility to utilize in-house expertise on the audit team.” Revisions to 
Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,430. 
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and BSEE’s attention, resources, and initiatives on . . . an underlying 
safety culture to promote continuous improvements in safety and 
environmental performance.”135 SEMS is intended to be a “dynamic 
program,” and BSEE has made efforts to increase the flexibility of its 
rules and to make them less prescriptive; this includes allowing operators 
to propose alternative procedures and technologies for BSEE’s approval, 
provided they meet safety and environmental protection standards at 
least equivalent to those set forth in BSEE’s regulations.136 Some have 
described the new SEMS approach as “methodologically distinct,” and 
BSEE itself acknowledges that the new approach constitutes a departure 
from the often-prescriptive OCS regulatory scheme employed in the 
past.137 
Another shift has taken place among the key players participating in 
the OCS regulatory scheme. Some participants are new. The DOI created 
the Offshore Energy Safety Advisory Commission (OESAC) to fill a 
research and advisory role for BSEE.138 In 2011, the API created the 
Center for Offshore Safety (COS) to create SEMS audit documents and 
auditor certification processes and to otherwise promote OCS safety 
programs.139 Other role players remain: the MMS (in its new incarnation 
                                                                                                             
 135. Issue Memorandum from Doug Morris, Chief, Office of Offshore Regulatory 
Programs, to Brian Salerno, Director, SEMS Program Summary – First Audit Cycle 
2011-2013 (July 23, 2014). 
 136. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 
at 20,426, 20,427, 20,433. 
 137. Betsy Baker & Roman Sidortsov, The Legal and Regulatory Regime for 
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also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 297-98 & 298 n.207. In 2013, the OESAC’s Safety 
Management Subcommittee made a number of recommendations for substantial 
revision to the SEMS regulations. See Letter from Thomas O. Hunter, Chairman, 
Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Comm., to James A. Watson, Director, Bureau of 
Safety and Envt.’l Enforcement (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.bsee 
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 139. See Center for Offshore Safety: Establishing a Culture of Safety, AM. 
PETROLEUM INST., http://www.centerforoffshoresafety.org/ [https://perma.cc/G6VT-
7ZCC] (last visited July 5, 2015); see also Weaver, supra note 90, at 404. 
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as BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR) and the API (which aside from the DOI is 
the oldest of all the OCS organizations still actively participating in OCS 
regulation).140 
New cooperative endeavors are also part of the post-Macondo 
regulatory landscape. The SEMS regulations contain numerous 
statements about flexibility and incorporate many of the API’s 
publications by reference, most notably APR RP 75.141 In addition, BSEE 
and COS will work together to evaluate industry compliance by 
developing “indicators to gauge industry OCS performance,”142 and a 
number of the API’s Joint Industry Task Force recommendations have 
been implemented by BSEE through NTLs.143 Despite the changes to the 
OCS regulatory scheme, the participants—regulators and industry 
representatives—are not fundamentally different. And regulators’ 
adoption of industry recommendations has long been the practice on the 
OCS.144 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the responses to prior oil spills in the Santa Barbara 
Channel and Prince William Sound, responses to the Macondo event in 
the Gulf of Mexico have been more executive and regulatory than 
legislative. The lack of major congressional action setting forth a new 
legal framework for the OCS in response to the Macondo event may 
indicate that little has changed.145 In some ways, it may make little 
difference whether reforms are implemented via executive and 
regulatory actions rather than legislatively. The MMS reorganization 
proposed in the CLEAR Act was instead effected by the Secretary’s 
executive order, with no real difference in the ultimate result. 
Although enactment of major federal legislation in response to an 
environmental disaster holds the possibility of fundamental change in the 
regulatory structure, it is also vulnerable to a too-narrow focus on the 
precipitating event. The failure of a legislature preoccupied with double-
hulled tankers to implement SEMS-related reforms in OPA may be an 
                                                                                                             
 140. See API History, supra note 5. 
 141. See, e.g., Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 
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example of such a vulnerability.146 Broad regulatory action might avoid 
this pitfall, especially if it draws from multiple sources and is responsive 
to a wider range of events. Because the SEMS regulations represent a 
cumulative reaction to a series of OCS operations failures, they may be 
less susceptible to the shortcomings of legislative reactions to a single 
event. Moreover, although the API’s involvement in post-oil spill 
regulatory responses is not new, the extent to which industry 
participation is built into the SEMS regulatory processes appears to be 
greater than in the past. The remaining question will be the extent to 
which SEMS enables all stakeholders—regulators and industry 
participants alike—to avoid or minimize offshore disasters. 
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